Elections in other countries usually do not affect daily life in the United States. But Venezuela’s authoritarian government plans to vote on Sunday as an exception. There could be consequences for immigration to the United States, the US-Mexico border and possibly the race for the White House.
If Venezuela’s socialist president, Nicolás Maduro, wins another term – which, given his opponents’ 25 to 30 points in the polls, would require a major fraud – even more Venezuelans will flee their country and its collapsing economy, joining nearly 8 million. already abroad. A new survey suggests that more than 10% of the country’s population would try to migrate if Maduro retains power. Many will move to the United States, likely bolstering Donald Trump’s claims of uncontrolled borders and undermining Democratic prospects.
But if the opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia wins in a landslide as the polls predict – and if, against all odds, the critical mass from within the Maduro government admits – Venezuela may be ready to change direction towards greater stability, more democracy and less emigration.
This is what María Corina Machado, the charismatic leader of the opposition, has promised, as she has crossed the country uniting voters behind González. (Machado himself would have been an option if the government had not banned him from running.)
While Machado promises that elections can bring change – and many Venezuelans are eager to believe – nobody ignores the obvious: Maduro, at the expense of the US Department of Justice, the gift of the US State Department and International Criminal Court Investigation of extrajudicial killings and torture hanging over his head, has every push to fight to stay in power regardless of the result. Many hoped that he would hold elections like before and use the military to quell post-election protests.
His administration has targeted many people tied to Machado, from him upper guard to the vendor who sold him empanadas On Thursday, he accused government agents of cutting the car’s brakes.
But Venezuelans may not hope for change in vain. Sometimes authoritarians can’t control elections, even those who try to write the script first. The Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and, more recently, Guatemala and Honduras have all seen autocrats confidently go to elections they thought they could control only to fail. The avalanche of opposition is too great to remove by fraud, attempts to deny the results lead to mass protests, or government and military insiders defect, leaving the autocrat isolated.
The probability of such a scenario playing out in Venezuela, while low, is not zero. What can force Maduro to accept losses? Three factors are important elsewhere and are also important in Venezuela: the military, the electorate and other countries in the region.
For autocrats, the support of military generals is the main backstop. With a man with a gun on the side, you can ride out almost any amount of popular pressure. Here, Maduro seems to have his footing: He controls the military with a carrot and stick system. Carrots include military control of main sector from economics and arranged crime. Sign that kidnapping and abuse people suspected of disloyalty to Venezuela and Cuba counterintelligence agents.
If the military abandons Maduro after the vote – if big – it will be because the carrot has run out and the opposition promised protection from prosecution. The middle ranks of the army – who have suffered more from their normal life in Venezuela than from the spoils of the generals – are not happy, according to leading experts. And between the Biden administration’s new sanctions on Venezuelan oil and Maduro’s spending spree, the president could be short on cash to line the general’s pockets. Some saw signs of slipping determination in the security forces’ relative restraint in countering some recent opposition demonstrations.
State voters are another key factor. For years, infighting in the opposition has led to voter apathy. But today the opposition is united and organized as before, energizing the voters, almost half of which said the pollsters will protest if there is election fraud.
Make no mistake: These elections will not be free or fair. Maduro’s government has dominate voter suppression and manipulation.
But his margins matter, and Maduro rarely trails his challengers in the polls. Removing a 5- or 10-point defeat with fraud is one thing; another 30-point loss. In addition, the opposition is ready to take the polls and note the deviations. The same effort allowed the Honduran opposition to prove victory in 2021 and force the ruling party to concede. The bigger and more indisputable the landslide, the more likely Maduro will lose control.
A third important variable is Venezuela’s neighborhood – or, better, neighborhood: Latin America and the United States. Regional powers have facilitated other democratic transitions by putting pressure on authoritarians by assuring them that they will not lose everything (including freedom) if they relinquish power.
It’s trickier here. Maduro and his inner circle have been used to US economic sanctions and other pressures. They may be afraid of the tightening of sanctions by President Biden, who has cleverly reined in to preserve influence, but more afraid of losing power. And Maduro doesn’t trust other governments to guarantee him bankruptcy if he steps down. The leftist presidents of Colombia and Brazil, who have been unable to criticize and apologize to Maduro, are unlikely to push Maduro publicly, but could mediate government-opposition negotiations in the event of a contested election.
If the improbable happens on Sunday and the result is a serious threat to the regime, it is only the beginning. Negotiations on power-sharing and a bankruptcy for Maduro may be underway. The US Embassy in Caracas is finally able to reopen and begin working with the Venezuelan government to address the economic chaos and mass migration.
But if it is expected to happen and Maduro clings to power by fraud and other illegal means, Venezuela will have missed perhaps the last best chance for change for a long time. Instability will remain and may deepen, and Latin America and the United States will have no choice but to absorb the consequences.
Will Freeman is a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
